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ANOTHER ARROW IN THE QUIVER: PRESERVING THE
FRESH START IN DEBT COLLECTION BY CREATING A
NATIONAL REGISTRY FOR DISCHARGE ORDERS
ABSTRACT
The debtor’s fresh start is violated when a creditor attempts to collect on a
discharged debt as a personal liability of the debtor. Even if that attempt is
unintentional—i.e., not willful—the fresh start has been hampered. Under the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, debt collectors are not expected to have
the same knowledge about a debt as the original creditor. Thus, a debt
collector may unintentionally violate a discharge injunction by sending a
collection letter or making a collection phone call. The Bankruptcy Code
cannot remedy this scenario because violations of the injunction require a
contempt analysis, which requires a willful violation to award damages.
Likewise, the FDCPA recognizes the knowledge disparity between creditors
and debt collectors, and allows debt collectors to make an initial contact
without violating its prohibition on unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices.
Debtors have a number of tools at their disposal to remedy abusive
practices, none of which touches on this exact scenario. This Comment argues
that debtors are unable to fully remedy the violation of their discharge
injunctions through existing law, and that amending the Code is not the
solution. Rather, the problem of discharge injunction violations should be
viewed primarily as a product of the debt collection industry. Thus, this
Comment suggests creating a national registry to house discharge orders,
requiring debt collectors to search the registry prior to making a first
collection attempt, and proposes that the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau is better suited to implementing the registry than bankruptcy courts.
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INTRODUCTION
In the gray area that is the intersection of the American bankruptcy scheme
and the debt collection system, debt collection practices may violate the
debtor’s fresh start. Under the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”), people who file
for bankruptcy and fulfill the relevant requirements are granted a discharge
order. This order does not “wipe out” the debtor’s debts, but simply cuts off
the debtor’s personal liability for those debts that are discharged in the
bankruptcy case. This distinction is important because it means that discharged
debts still exist outside of bankruptcy: they can be sold to debt buyers,1 and
debtors may voluntarily repay them.2
With over 77 million Americans having a debt in collection,3 the potential
for abuses by debt collectors exists. Consumers now fear “zombie debts”:
debts they thought they no longer owed but which are given new life by
collection efforts.4 Zombie debt affects many consumers, not just those who
have gone through bankruptcy.5 For example, in July 2015, JPMorgan Chase
was found to have sold zombie debts to third-party debt buyers in the form of
“accounts that were inaccurate, settled, discharged in bankruptcy, not owed, or
otherwise not collectible.”6 For the debts discharged in bankruptcy, any
attempts to collect by the third-party debt buyers would have violated those
debtors’ discharge injunctions and, thus, their fresh start.
This Comment suggests that one way to prevent this type of discharge
injunction violation is to create a national registry to house discharge
injunctions and require debt collectors, including third-party debt buyers, to
confirm the status of a debt prior to attempting to collect on it. The registry
should be implemented by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

1

Finnie v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 275 B.R. 743, 746 (E.D. Va. 2002) (finding that § 524(a)(2) does not
prohibit creditors from selling discharged debt); see FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF
THE DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY 18 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/structureand-practices-debt-buying-industry/debtbuyingreport.pdf (discussing the practice of buying and selling “debts
of consumers who have filed for bankruptcy”).
2 11 U.S.C. § 524(f) (2012).
3 Dalié Jiménez, Dirty Debts Sold Dirt Cheap, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 41, 42 (2015).
4 Neil L. Sobol, Protecting Consumers from Zombie-Debt Collectors, 44 N.M. L. REV. 327, 330 (2014).
5 Id. (describing zombie debt as “a debt that is dead or non-existent, but has now come to life, and is
wreaking havoc on consumers and their credit histories”).
6 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB, 47 States and D.C. Take Action Against JPMorgan Chase for
Selling Bad Credit Card Debt and Robo-Signing Court Documents, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
BUREAU (July 8, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-47-states-and-d-c-take-actionagainst-jpmorgan-chase-for-selling-bad-credit-card-debt-and-robo-signing-court-documents/.
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(“Bureau”) under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), rather
than under the Code. The Bureau’s mission and rulemaking authority put it in
an excellent position to combat this type of zombie debt collection.
I. BACKGROUND: PRESERVING THE DISCHARGE INJUNCTION IS KEY TO
ADVANCING THE FRESH START
The fresh start is the sine qua non of the American system of bankruptcy,7
and its development underscores its important place. Bankruptcy law has
historically been a creditor’s remedy.8 The fresh start, a relatively recent
concept, had its birth in the American system in 1867.9 When the Bankruptcy
Act of 1867 was passed, it reflected “a compromise between debtor and
creditor interests.”10 This compromise was largely propelled “by a desire to
‘relieve the plight of debtors.’”11 This first attempt at legislating a fresh start
policy goal in bankruptcy did not last long, however—the 1867 Act was
repealed in 1878.12 The next time that Congress created a federal bankruptcy
system was in 1898, when it created a system very similar to the one currently
in place.13 The 1898 Act created a more debtor-friendly system which gave
debtors a discharge.14 Much like in the 1867 Act, the discharge created by the
1898 Act was justified by the social welfare, or social utility, argument.15
The social utility argument has two parts. First, the public interest is
benefited when a debtor is liberated from oppressive levels of debt and
permitted to return to being a productive member of society.16 Second,
society’s forgiveness of debts of the honest but unfortunate debtor is an act of

7 Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
67, 71 (2006) (“The long-standing and much-touted theory of consumer debt relief is that it provides a fresh
start for debt-laden individuals.”).
8 Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325,
326 (1991).
9 Id. at 355 (“Bankruptcy has been around for almost half a millennium in Anglo-American
jurisprudence, yet the discharge as we know it in the United States did not exist until the turn of this century.”).
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 361–62.
13 Id. at 363.
14 Id. at 364.
15 Id. at 364–65 n.321. This approach has also been termed “social insurance.” See Adam Feibelman,
Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 129
(2005) (“Bankruptcy scholars generally agree that consumer bankruptcy functions, at least in part, as a form of
social insurance.”).
16 Tabb, supra note 8, at 364–65.
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humanity to those in need.17 It is within this first line of reasoning that the
concept of the honest but unfortunate debtor arises.18 The legislative history
related to the passage of the 1898 Act shows that this view had the support of
some members of Congress. One House Report sympathetically characterized
the honest but unfortunate debtors as persons who have tried to make it but,
through no fault of their own, have met with misfortune:
[t]his vast number constitutes an army of men crippled financiallymost of them active, aggressive, honest men who have met with
misfortune in the struggle of life, and who, if relieved from the
burden of debt, would reenter the struggle with fresh hope and vigor
and become active and useful members of society.19

The fresh start remains a “principal goal” of our bankruptcy system.20 In
fact, Congress proclaimed “its intent to preserve the ‘fresh start for the honest
debtor’” when it enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act.21 In contrast to the longevity of the fresh start principle, the
humanitarian justification does not seem to have done as well. Shortly after its
enactment, the 1898 Act was criticized for being a “poor-debtor law.”22 Today,
we might consider that the humanitarian argument has been supplanted by
scientific studies of the physical, emotional, and psychological effects of
bankruptcy on a debtor. Such studies examine these effects of bankruptcy as a
way of measuring the success of bankruptcy in rehabilitating debtors.23
Rehabilitation is the notion that bankruptcy law can help put the debtor
back on his or her feet and is an important part of helping a debtor make the
17 Id. at 365. In an earlier article, Professor Tabb treated the humanitarian and social utility arguments as
separate justifications for the bankruptcy discharge. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in
Bankruptcy: Collateral Conversions and the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56 (1990). For
the purposes of this Comment, neither treatment (as separate justifications or as two parts of the same
justification) is particularly more beneficial than the other. Thus, this Comment arbitrarily treats them as being
two parts of the same argument.
18 Tabb, supra note 8, at 364.
19 Id. at 365 n.321.
20 Porter & Thorne, supra note 7, at 72.
21 Id. (“This rhetoric is especially notable because the general nature of the reforms was unfriendly to
most consumer debtors. Nevertheless, congressional representatives affirmed or at least gave the appearance of
affirming bankruptcy’s importance as an opportunity for a fresh start.”).
22 Tabb, supra note 8, at 366. It was also pejoratively compared to the “nature of a ‘Hebrew Jubilee.’”
See id. The “Hebrew Jubilee” was the biblically mandated cancellation of all debts every seven years. See id.
at 366 n.332.
23 Compare id. at 365 (tracing the historical arguments for the rehabilitative justification for the
discharge), with Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047,
1059–60, 1061 (1987) (discussing the psychological aspect of the rehabilitative justification for the discharge).
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most of the fresh start.24 The goals of rehabilitation include “consumer
financial education of the debtor, emotional and psychological relief from
financial failure, and renewed debtor participation in the open-credit
economy.”25
Today, the fresh start, with all of its notions of social utility and
rehabilitation, is protected by the discharge order, and is offended when a
creditor or a debt collector attempts to collect on a debt that has been
discharged in bankruptcy. The power of the discharge order to protect the
debtor’s fresh start is found in § 524(a), which voids any judgment attempting
to determine the personal liability of the debtor26 and enjoins any attempt to
collect on a discharged debt as a personal liability of the debtor.27 Technically
speaking, the discharge order does not wipe out debt; it only creates a
permanent injunction against debt collection.28 Thus, § 524(a)(2) is more of a
defensive weapon than an offensive weapon; it is more reactive than proactive.
The limits of the discharge injunction can be seen with a comparison of the
FDCPA and the Code. Under the FDCPA, the debt collector29 may send a
letter to the debtor alleging that the debt is owed and notifying the debtor of the
debtor’s right to request verification.30 When the debtor, or the debtor’s
attorney, informs the debt collector that the debt has been discharged, the
collection attempts are required to cease.31 Although the debt collector’s initial
contact letter is permitted under the FDCPA, the letter violates the debtor’s
fresh start because it is an act “to collect” a discharged debt from the debtor

24

Porter & Thorne, supra note 7, at 74.
Id. at 73 (citing Howard, supra note 23, at 1047, 1059).
26 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) (2012).
27 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2).
28 3 WILLIAM L. NORTON JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. § 58:2 (3d ed.
2008) (“Thus, the effect of a discharge is to interpose a permanent prohibition against debt collection rather
than to absolve the underlying debt retroactively.”).
29 The FDCPA distinguishes between creditors and debt collectors. Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d
726, 729 (7th Cir. 2004) (“A distinction between creditors and debt collectors is fundamental to the FDCPA,
which does not regulate creditors’ activities at all.”); see 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3), (6) (2012). By contrast, the
Code does not distinguish between the two, and a discharge injunction may be enforced against “both creditors
and debt collectors.” Randolph, 368 F.3d at 728. This Comment addresses primarily the actions of debt
collectors that violate the discharge injunction and thus uses the terms “debt collector” and “creditor” to
distinguish the differences between the two under the FDCPA.
30 What If I Believe I Do Not Owe The Debt Or I Want Proof Of The Debt?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1403/what-if-i-believe-i-do-not-owe-debt-or-i-want-proofdebt.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2016).
31 See Eastman v. Baker Recovery Servs. (In re Eastman), 419 B.R. 711, 730 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2009).
25
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personally.32 The bankruptcy court will provide little relief because the
discharge injunction, although violated by the collection letter, has not been
violated willfully. Requisite knowledge is necessary for the court to award
damages for a willful violation,33 but here the debt collector had no knowledge
that the debt had been discharged.
Although a technical violation of the discharge injunction has occurred,
proof of money damages is missing. The debtor’s fresh start has been violated,
however, by the collection attempt. This Comment seeks to reduce or eliminate
discharge violations by debt collectors, while also dealing fairly with debt
collectors who commonly lack knowledge about the debtor’s discharged status.
Debt collectors may violate the injunction intentionally or unintentionally.
Many of the violations are likely unintentional, a result brought about by
creditors who sell debt portfolios with incomplete information on accounts. A
debt collector may have many accounts that have been discharged in
bankruptcy, but the account portfolio only mentions that the debt is delinquent,
not that the debtor has filed for bankruptcy relief. It would not be fair to punish
the debt collector for having no knowledge of the debt’s discharged status.
Debt collectors need a reliable source of information regarding discharged
debts. One way to establish a reliable source of information is to create a
national registry for housing discharge orders (“Registry System”).
The national registry will protect the fresh start by giving debtors a way to
put the world on notice; by punishing bad actors; and by giving debt collectors
a reliable source of information when their debt portfolios paint an incomplete
picture. There will always be bad actors, but the proposed Registry System will
punish bad actors while protecting debt collectors acting in good faith by
requiring debt collectors to search the registry prior to taking any act to collect
on a debt.
II. THE EXISTING MARKET
Debt collection is a part of life for many Americans because of the high
levels of consumer debt in America. The level of American consumer debt
32

11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2).
In re Eastman, 419 B.R. at 730 (alteration in original) (quoting Torres v. Chase Bank USA, N.A. (In re
Torres), 367 B.R. 478, 490 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)) (“To succeed [in a claim for willful violation of
§ 524(a)(2)] the debtor must ‘show by [clear and convincing evidence] that the offending . . . entity had
knowledge [actual or constructive] of the discharge and willfully violated it by continuing with the activity
complained of.’”); 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2).
33
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exceeds $2.7 trillion.34 While nearly three in four “American families own at
least one credit card,” the average per household credit card debt is about
$7,400.35 With the large amounts of credit card debt, delinquent debt36 is
commonplace in America, with more than 77 million people having a debt in
collection.37 The proliferation of debt since the 1970s has been accompanied
by growth in the debt-collection industry, with over four times as many
collection jobs today as in the 1970s.38 This industry generates between one
and four billion collection calls annually.39
The phenomenon of seeking payment of debts from people who are no
longer legally obligated to pay those debts has been described as “zombie
debt.”40 As Neil Sobol notes, the phrase “zombie debt” encourages analogy to
zombie movies:
Just as the zombies in movies come back from the dead to terrorize
individuals, dead debts may resurface to wreak havoc on consumers.
Even if a consumer successfully defeats one zombie-debt collector,
the process may restart if the debt is resold.41

When a debt persists in a delinquent status, creditors generally rely on three
principal collection methods—creditors choose to (1) collect delinquent debts
themselves; (2) hire a third-party debt collector; or (3) sell debts to debt
buyers.42 A 2009 Government Accountability Office Report on Credit Cards
found that credit card issuers usually collect debts delinquent for less than six
months themselves.43 Older accounts, however, often get outsourced to thirdparty debt collectors.44
34

Sobol, supra note 4, at 333. This amount does not “include debt secured by real estate.” Id. at 334.
Id. at 334.
36 Debts are marked delinquent when consumers do not pay on time. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1,
at 13 n.57.
37 Jiménez, supra note 3, at 42.
38 Sobol, supra note 4, at 334.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 327 n.1 (citing media articles utilizing the term “zombie debt”).
41 Id. at 327–28 (2014).
42 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 11.
43 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-748, CREDIT CARDS: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION
PRACTICES ACT COULD BETTER REFLECT THE EVOLVING DEBT COLLECTION MARKETPLACE AND USE OF
TECHNOLOGY (2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/295588.pdf (stating that credit card companies typically
use “internal collection departments or ‘first-party’ agencies that collect under the issuer’s name”). First-party
agencies function as a supplement to internal departments; are paid on “a fee-for-service rather than
contingency basis”; and focus on “preserving the relationship with the consumer and mitigating the negative
perception that consumers can have about” collection efforts. Id. at 21.
44 Id.
35
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Third-party debt collectors may be used because the creditor lacks
sufficient expertise in applicable collection law or infrastructure to pursue
collection efforts.45 An important benefit to employing a debt collector is that
the creditor retains a degree of control over the type of collection efforts
utilized, allowing creditors some ability to avoid harm to its reputation which
can occur through collection agencies.46 Third-party debt collectors are a
popular choice, with $6.56 billion generated in 2014 by third-party debt
collectors.47 This figure represents more than half of the debt collection
industry’s revenue in 2014.48 Debt collection can be a difficult and timeconsuming task, however, so creditors often sell the unsatisfied debts to debt
collection firms or debt buyers.49
The option of selling a debt to a debt buyer is a more recent option for
creditors and is made popular for three reasons: (1) federal banking
regulations; (2) the closure that accompanies selling; and (3) the presence of
willing debt buyers. First, federal banking regulations require that credit card
debts be charged off after a specified period of time and permit the proceeds
from a debt sale to be “counted as assets for capital requirements.”50 By
contrast, charging off a debt does not permit banks to treat the charged-off
amounts toward capital requirements.51 Thus, the ability to sell the debt allows
creditors to offset some of their losses.
Second, a sale to a debt buyer brings some closure to the delinquent
account in the form of a guaranteed amount, rather than waiting to see if a third
party can collect any amounts.52 Although debts are sold for pennies on the
dollar,53 by selling debts to debt buyers, creditors reduce the losses associated

45

FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 11.
Id.
47 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 2015 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU ANN. REP. 7 (2015), http://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb-fair-debt-collection-practices-act.pdf (Third-party debt collectors
earn money by “charging fees for services, often a percentage of the amount collected.”).
48 Id.
49 Jiménez, supra note 3, at 42.
50 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 13.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 12 (citing Rozanne M. Andersen & Andrew M. Beato, ACA Int’l, Comment of ACA
International Regarding the Debt Collection Workshop 7 n.6 (June 6, 2007)) (“[C]reditors may choose to
receive an immediate and guaranteed amount from debt sales rather than receiving a delayed and uncertain
amount as a result of the efforts of third-party debt collectors.”).
53 Id. at 22–23.
46
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with extending credit, which in turn “is likely to lead to an increase in the
amount of credit extended and a decrease in the price of that credit.”54
Third, creditors find willing debt buyers in the market. More than 75% of
debts sold are credit card debts.55 For example, in 2008, the nine largest debt
buyers purchased over $72 billion of consumer debt.56 About 76.8% of that, or
$55.5 billion, was credit card debt.57 At least one author has suggested that the
option of a debt sale is becoming more popular with credit card issuers.58 One
reason for this popularity could be that debt buyers are often in a better
position than creditors to adopt more aggressive collection practices.59 On the
other hand, the FTC Report found that some large creditors sell charged off
debts discriminately, choosing buyers whose collection practices are less likely
to cause harm to the creditors’ reputations.60 The reality of annual debt sales in
the billions of dollars, however, suggests that a market exists, although the low
purchasing costs highlight how risky the investment can be.61
The characteristics of the debt-buying industry make violations of the
discharge injunction more likely to occur for two reasons: the low costs of
debts; and the lack of information in debt purchase agreements. First, the low
costs that debt buyers are willing to pay, and that sellers are willing to accept,
for debts indicates the risks of debt buying. The low cost of purchasing
defaulted debt impugns the market for purchasing defaulted debts: “The less
the seller is willing to ‘stand by’ the accounts it sells—for example, if the seller
disclaims all warranties of title or accuracy of the information provided—the
cheaper the debt.”62 The FTC Report found an average purchase price of “4.0

54 Id. at 11 (citing studies); see also Julie D. Hoffmeister & David N. Anthony, Is Dodd-Frank Doing
More Harm Than Good?, TROUTMAN SANDERS: CONSUMER FIN. SERVS. L. MONITOR (Feb. 8, 2016),
http://www.consumerfinancialserviceslawmonitor.com/2016/02/is-dodd-frank-doing-more-harm-than-good/
(citing study by American Action Forum which found “a 14.5 percent cut in consumer revolving credit since”
Dodd-Frank’s enactment and blamed Dodd-Frank’s regulatory costs in time and money).
55 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 13.
56 Id. at 7.
57 Id.
58 Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.
375, 390–91 (2007) (“Although my thoughts on this topic are relatively impressionistic, discussions with
industry sources suggest that major credit card issuers are increasingly moving towards selling defaulted credit
card debt.”).
59 Id. at 391.
60 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 20.
61 See id. at 23 (“[A]lthough the price paid by debt buyers for debts is low relative to their face value, it
does not necessarily follow that the profit from collecting on those debts will be high.”).
62 Jiménez, supra note 3, at 43.
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cents for each dollar of debt.”63 Older debts are worth less than newer ones,
with an average price of “2.2 cents per dollar of debt for debts that were 6 to
15 years old compared to 7.9 cents per dollar for debts less than three years
old.”64 Relatedly, debt buyers still have to incur costs for collection attempts,
and collection efforts do not always produce recoveries.65 Nor do debt buyers
attempt collection efforts on all the accounts they purchased, which further
limits their recoveries.66 The debt-buying industry is a gamble, albeit one that
many find worth the risk.
For example, in 2015, the Bureau settled an enforcement action against the
“nation’s two largest debt buyers and collectors for using deceptive tactics to
collect bad debt.”67 The two companies purchased debts that were “potentially
inaccurate, lacking documentation, or unenforceable,” and then successfully
collected on many of those unverified debts through unfair practices, including
making false statements to debtors and filing lawsuits “using robo-signed court
documents.”68 Many of these lawsuits resulted in default judgments against the
consumers.69 Default judgments are powerful tools that can make debts
enforceable that are not otherwise enforceable.70 Thus, a debt barred by a
statute of limitations gets a new lease on (zombie) life.
Second, debt buyers are likely to try to collect a debt which has been
discharged in bankruptcy because debt buyers receive limited information
about the debts they purchase. Many debt buyers receive incomplete
information when making purchases from the original creditor for a few
reasons. The first is that purchase and sale agreements used in the sale of debt
are usually drafted by the sellers.71 Further, sellers often sell the debts “as is,”
disclaiming “all warranties and representations regarding the accuracy of the
information” they include about the debts.72 The debt buyer is permitted to
63

FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 23.
Id. at 23–24.
65 Id. at 23.
66 Id.
67 CFPB Takes Action Against the Two Largest Debt Buyers for Using Deceptive Tactics to Collect Bad
Debts, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpbtakes-action-against-the-two-largest-debt-buyers-for-using-deceptive-tactics-to-collect-bad-debts/.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Sobol, supra note 4, at 330.
71 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 24.
72 Id. at 25. The FTC Report also noted that it “did not test the accuracy of the information conveyed by
debt sellers to debt buyers. Accordingly, the study does not permit any conclusions to be drawn as to the
prevalence of errors or inaccuracies in debts generally sold ‘as is.’” Id.
64
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“put back” accounts that did not fit the profile of the purchased portfolio,
however.73 Nonetheless, most agreements “provided very limited, if any,” putback remedy on the basis of “missing or inaccurate” information.74 Finally,
agreements conferred limited rights upon debt buyers to request and obtain
“documents associated with creating and servicing” the purchased debts
through limiting the time in which to request documents at no charge, the
frequency of requesting documents, the amount of documents that could be
requested, and the time after which the debt buyer can no longer request
documents, even at cost.75
These risks can be exacerbated when debts are resold. The purchase and
sale agreements used frequently permit resale.76 Most of the agreements that
permit resale require that the resale be subject to the same terms and conditions
as the original agreement.77 The limits on obtaining copies of the creating and
servicing documents are increased as the original creditors have no contractual
obligation to provide any documents to the resold debt buyers.78 As a
consequence, the resold debt buyers’ only chance of getting the relevant
documents is to request them from the original debt buyer, who then requests
them from the original seller.79
Recently, however, the debt buying industry has undergone some changes,
with more expected soon.80 One major change began with a 2014 guidance
document issued by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (“OCC”).81 The
OCC’s guidance document applies to “all outright legal sales of charged-off
debt by banks”82 and suggests “best practices” to reduce the risks associated
with the debt buying industry.83 In response to this added layer of regulations,

73

Id.
Id.
75 Id. at 26.
76 Jiménez, supra note 3, at 66; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 27.
77 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 27.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 28.
80 Terry Carter, Debt-buying Industry and Lax Court Review Are Burying Defendants in Defaults, A.B.A.
J. (Nov. 1, 2015, 4:20 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/debt_buying_industry_and_lax_
court_review_are_burying_defendants_in_default (noting that the CFPB is expected to issue “comprehensive
rules regulating debt collection and debt buying” in 2016).
81 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, supra note 47, at 9.
82 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OCC BULL. NO.
2014–37, CONSUMER DEBT SALES: RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE 2 (2014), http://www.occ.gov/newsissuances/bulletins/2014/bulletin-2014-37.html.
83 Id. at 8 n.2.
74
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some smaller collection firms have stopped buying credit card debt or have
been bought up by larger firms.84
Another change has come with the Bureau’s enforcement activities. For
example, in July 2015, the Bureau entered into a consent agreement with
JPMorgan Chase arising out of an administrative action alleging, inter alia, that
Chase sold bad credit card debts.85 The “zombie debts” that Chase sold
included “accounts that were inaccurate, settled, discharged in bankruptcy, not
owed, or otherwise not collectible.”86 The consent agreement requires Chase
to: verify debts before attempting collections; cease collection activities
(including sales to debt buyers) on the known bad debts; refund approximately
$50 million to consumers; and pay $166 million in penalties to various
government agencies involved in the administrative action.87
Combining Bureau enforcement actions with new regulations of the debt
buying industry is necessary if the Bureau wants to keep pace with changes in
the debt collection industry.88 Debt collection remains a constant source of
consumer complaints. December 2015 marked the twenty-eighth consecutive
month in which “debt collection” was the highest category of consumer
complaints to the Bureau.89 In 2014, the first full year of data on debt
collection complaints, 37% of consumers complained about attempts to collect
on debts no longer owed.90 Among these consumer complaints, 4% specifically
reported that the “debt was discharged in bankruptcy.”91
Consumer complaints also address collection efforts on debts no longer
owed, with debtors reporting frustration with the level of documentation
provided by debt collectors, confusion about their rights to dispute a debt, and
84

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, supra note 47, at 9.
CFPB, 47 States and D.C. Take Action Against JPMorgan Chase for Selling Bad Credit Card Debt
and Robo-Signing Court Documents, supra note 6; Chase Bank, USA N.A. & Chase Bankcard Servs., Inc.,
CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0013, 2015 WL 5209143 (July 8, 2015).
86 CFPB, 47 States and D.C. Take Action Against JPMorgan Chase for Selling Bad Credit Card Debt
and Robo-Signing Court Documents, supra note 6.
87 Id. (“Chase will pay . . . $136 million in penalties and payments to the CFPB and states, and a $30
million penalty to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) in a related action.”).
88 See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, supra note 47, at 10 (“Since the FDCPA has not been
substantially updated since 1977, there can be some uncertainty as to what the law requires in some
circumstances. The bureau expects that its rulemaking activities will address many of the primary uncertainties
in the market, promote compliant debt collection practices, lessen unfair competition from bad actors, and
most importantly, assist in protecting consumers from illegitimate collection practices.”).
89 7 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU MONTHLY COMPLAINT REP. 6 (2016).
90 See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, supra note 47, at 13.
91 See id.
85
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threats to take illegal action.92 First, consumers have difficulty obtaining debt
validation from collectors.93 When asking debt collectors for supporting
documentation, they report frustration at the amount of documentation
provided.94 Second, a trend in complaints in 2014 is that companies purchased
“second mortgages that were discharged in bankruptcy and then pursu[ed]
foreclosure on the mortgages.”95 Third, consumers continue to report attempts
to collect debts no longer owed.96
The poor flow of information between creditors and debt collectors creates
a strong possibility that debt collectors will try to collect on debts that are no
longer legally owed. This possibility is supported by consumer complaint data
collected by the Bureau, which receives consumer complaints and publishes
data on these complaints in accordance with Congress’s mandate.97 Debt
collection is one of the leading sources of consumer complaints. For example,
the Bureau received more than 30,000 complaints about debt collection from
July 2013 through the end of the 2013 calendar year; 34% of those complaints
were about collection efforts on debts not owed.98 Similarly, during 2014, 35%
of the total number of consumer complaints received were related to debt
collection99 and included original creditors and third-party debt collectors.100
Of the more than 88,000 debt collection complaints received, 37% related to
attempts to collect on a debt no longer owed.101
III. THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK FOR REMEDYING A VIOLATION OF THE
DISCHARGE INJUNCTION DOES NOT ADEQUATELY PROTECT THE DEBTOR’S
FRESH START
The discharge injunction protects the debtor’s fresh start by, inter alia,
enjoining attempts to collect on the debt as a personal liability of the debtor.102
The discharge does not wipe out any debts, however; it simply cuts off
92

See id. at 14.
See id.
94 Consumer Response Annual Report (January 1–December 31, 2014), 2015 CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU ANN. REP. 19, http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_consumer-response-annual-report2014.pdf.
95 Id. at 17.
96 Id. at 16.
97 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1021, 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2012).
98 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, supra note 47, at 11–12.
99 Consumer Response Annual Report (January 1–December 31, 2014), supra note 94, at 14 fig.4.
100 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, supra note 47, at 11–12.
101 Id.
102 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2012).
93
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personal liability. In practice, this nuance can be seen by the fact that secured
creditors may pursue in rem liability, and both secured and unsecured creditors
may sell discharged debts. At least the secured creditor has a remedy in rem.
The unsecured creditor, however, has to forgive its debtors. Sometimes, the
only way for an unsecured creditor to make up some of the losses caused by a
discharge is to sell off the debt, but, as shown, debt sales are fraught with
danger and potential abuses.
Debt sales can be lucrative for buyers and sellers, and they serve an
important role in the consumer credit economy. Outlawing debt sales could
have serious consequences to consumer access to revolving credit. For that
reason, an outright ban on debt sales should not be the first solution. Rather,
empowering debtors with a weapon to fight violations—both intentional and
unintentional—of the discharge will bring some order to the tumultuous
landscape of debt sales.
Currently, the Bureau seeks to bring order to this landscape by combatting
unfair, deceptive, and abusive debt collection practices on behalf of consumers,
including bankruptcy debtors. For example, in 2015, the Bureau put an end to
the abusive practices of a debt collection lawsuit mill.103 In Consumer
Financial Protective Bureau v. Frederick J. Hanna & Associates, the Bureau
alleged that a Georgia law firm (“Firm”) habitually filed collection lawsuits
with “faulty or unsubstantiated evidence” regarding the debts owed.104 The
Firm brought more than 350,000 collection suits between 2009 and 2013.105
Given the small number of attorneys and the large number of non-attorney
staff employed by the firm, the suits were likely brought without “meaningful
attorney involvement.”106 The Bureau sued the Firm to stop what it perceived
as an intimidation technique: using deceptive court filings when other
collection efforts have failed.107
Another deceptive practice in lawsuits concerns affidavits that are falsified
or robo-signed. In 2016, the Bureau settled a case against Citibank and the debt
103 CFPB Takes Action to Stop Illegal Debt Collection Lawsuit Mill, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU
(Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-to-stop-illegal-debt-collectionlawsuit-mill/.
104 Id.
105 Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Frederick J. Hanna & Assocs., P.C., 114 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1349 (N.D.
Ga. 2015).
106 See id. at 1349. In the court’s Order denying the Firm’s Motion to Dismiss, the court found that the
Bureau’s allegation of no meaningful attorney involvement “makes sense, given the alleged ratio of the
volume of lawsuits filed to the number of attorneys at the Firm.” See id. at 1350.
107 CFPB Takes Action to Stop Illegal Debt Collection Lawsuit Mill, supra note 103.
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collection law firms it employed, accusing the law firms of altering the “dates
of the affidavits, the amount of the debt allegedly owed, or both, after the
affidavits were executed.”108
Similarly, multiple higher profile suits have been brought against
JPMorgan Chase for its tactics in credit card collection efforts, including filing
lawsuits with robo-signed affidavits, furnishing the courts with improper
supporting documentation, and selling zombie credit card debts to third-party
collectors. Although Chase ceased such illegal practices in 2011 after an
investigation by the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, its illegal
practices spawned lawsuits by most of the states.109 The Bureau and the
attorneys general of 47 states and the District of Columbia settled their
enforcement action in July 2015, forcing Chase to pay $136 million in
penalties and payments to the Bureau, plus $50 million in consumer refunds.110
Consumers must constantly be on guard for these kinds of unfair,
deceptive, and abusive practices by debt collectors. Likewise, debtors must
vigilantly watch out for such practices concerning debts that have been
discharged in bankruptcy because many years may sometimes pass between a
bankruptcy discharge and a collection lawsuit.
IV. REMEDYING VIOLATIONS
The broad language of § 524 exemplifies the intent of Congress “to give
complete effect to the discharge and to eliminate any doubt concerning the
effect of the discharge as a total prohibition on debt collection efforts.”111 Any
act to collect on a discharged debt from the debtor as a personal liability is a
violation of the injunction.112 Whether a party has violated the injunction is not
always difficult to determine. The difficulty arises in assessing damages
108 CFPB Orders Citibank to Provide Relief to Consumers for Illegal Debt Sales and Collection
Practices, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpborders-citibank-to-provide-relief-toconsumers-for-illegal-debt-sales-and-collection-practices/.
109 Chris Cumming, Mississippi AG Sues JPMorgan Chase Over Debt Collections, AM. BANKER (Dec. 17,
2013),
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_241/mississippi-ag-sues-jpmorgan-chase-over-debtcollections-1064406-1.html.
110 CFPB, 47 States and D.C. Take Action Against JPMorgan Chase for Selling Bad Credit Card Debt
and Robo-Signing Court Documents, supra note 6.
111 Robert P. Wasson, Jr., Remedying Violations of the Discharge Injunction Under Bankruptcy Code
§ 524, Federal Non-Bankruptcy Law, and State Law Comports with Congressional Intent, Federalism, and
Supreme Court Jurisprudence for Identifying the Existence of an Implied Right of Action, 20 BANKR. DEV. J.
77, 105 (2003) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 365 (1977)).
112 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2012).
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because § 524 is silent on the topic.113 Courts have accordingly relied on their
contempt powers to remedy violations and, in some cases, to award
damages.114 Contempt powers, however, offer limited relief to debtors. Thus,
debtors also have advanced different legal arguments to enhance the relief
afforded to them. Below is a discussion of the different arguments debtors have
advanced in attempts to enhance their relief.
A. Two Sources of Contempt
Bankruptcy courts possess two types of contempt powers with which to
remedy violations of the § 524 injunction: statutory and inherent. Statutory
contempt powers in the bankruptcy context originate in § 105, which gives
courts the authority to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”115 Statutory contempt is
fundamental to enforcing the discharge order. As one court noted, without the
statutory power to enforce their own orders, bankruptcy courts would issue
orders in vain:
It would be ironic indeed and nothing more than an exercise in
futility to grant a Debtor a discharge, together with a permanent
injunction prohibiting the pursuit of the Debtor after discharge in an
attempt to enforce discharged pre-petition debts, if the very court
which granted the discharge would be powerless to enforce an
obedience of the order and permit violation of the permanent
injunction with impunity.116

Compensatory damages may be awarded under the § 105 contempt authority
upon a showing that a party “willfully violated the permanent injunction of
§ 524.”117 If a party was unaware of the discharge when it attempted to collect
a debt from the debtor, then it cannot be held in contempt.
The Eleventh Circuit has applied a two-part test to determine the willful
nature of a violation.118 The debtor carries the burden of proving these two

113 In re Eastman, 419 B.R. 711, 724 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2009) (finding that § 524 “does not prescribe the
debtor a specific remedy if a creditor violates the discharge injunction”).
114 E.g., Bigham v. Equip. Leasing Specialists, Inc., No. 2:99-CV-119, 1999 WL 1005709, at *2 (W.D.
Mich. Oct. 12, 1999) (relying on contempt powers to sanction a violation of the discharge injunction).
115 11 U.S.C. § 105.
116 Braun v. Champion Credit Union (In re Braun), 141 B.R. 133 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992) (quoting In re
Miller, 81 B.R. 669, 678–79 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988)), aff’d, 152 B.R. 466 (N.D. Ohio 1993).
117 Hardy v. United States (In re Hardy), 97 F.3d 1384, 1390 (11th Cir. 1996).
118 See id.
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parts by “clear and convincing evidence.”119 First, the party must have known
that the injunction was in place.120 This knowledge may be either “actual or
constructive.”121 Second, the party must have “intended the actions which
violated” the injunction.122 Thus, in Bigham v. Equipment Leasing Specialists,
Inc., the debtor’s motion for damages relating to a violation of the injunction
was denied because there was adequate evidence that the creditor did not have
notice of the bankruptcy.123 In cases where the violation was willful, however,
courts may award compensatory damages and impose sanctions.124
Furthermore, in cases where a party acts willfully and “in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons,” courts may also award
attorney’s fees.125
Inherent contempt powers, by comparison, originate in “the control
necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the
orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”126 Such control empowers courts
“to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to
their lawful mandates.”127 In the bankruptcy context, courts wield their
inherent contempt power “to award actual damages for violation of § 524,”
even though the text of § 524 does not actually provide the remedy for
violations of the injunction.128 Courts should invoke inherent contempt powers
with “caution,”129 however, reserving them for particularly egregious
behavior.130 Courts use inherent contempt powers to punish parties for acting
in bad faith.131

119

In re Torres, 367 B.R. 478, 490 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
In re Hardy, 97 F.3d at 1390.
121 In re Torres, 367 B.R. at 490.
122 In re Hardy, 97 F.3d at 1390.
123 Bigham v. Equip. Leasing Specialists, Inc., No. 2:99-CV-119, 1999 WL 1005709, at *3 (W.D. Mich.
Oct. 12, 1999).
124 In re Ramos, 2013 WL 5461859, at *1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).
125 In re Ramos, 2013 WL 5461859, at *1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).
126 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630–
31 (1962)).
127 Id. (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821)).
128 In re Hardy, 97 F.3d at 1389.
129 Id. (quoting Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44–45).
130 See id. at 1389 n.3 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Bad faith conduct includes conduct that is vexatious, wanton or
oppressive.”).
131 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 48–49 (permitting a court to award attorney’s fees under the court’s “inherent
power would require a finding of bad faith”); Glatter v. Mroz (In re Mroz), 65 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir.
1995) (“Invocation of a court’s inherent power requires a finding of bad faith.”).
120
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The nature of the sanctions imposed through the statutory and inherent
contempt powers of the bankruptcy court may be either coercive or punitive,
although circuits are not in agreement about whether bankruptcy courts even
have authority to mete out punitive contempt.132 It is, however, generally
accepted that the bankruptcy court has the power “to coerce compliance with a
court order or to compensate another party for the contemnor’s violation
(coercive sanctions),”133 but only some jurisdictions recognize the court’s
power “to punish the contemnor and vindicate the authority of the court
(punitive sanctions).”134 One author has summarized the problem with punitive
damages jurisprudence as being “so subjective that its availability is
uncertain.”135 Among the circuits holding that bankruptcy courts do have
authority to issue punitive sanctions, the availability of punitive sanctions
depends on the context.136 The justification for punitive damages is reserved
for cases of egregious conduct, malicious conduct, or bad faith.137 Thus, in
jurisdictions that recognize both coercive and punitive contempt powers,
categorizing the court’s contempt powers as either “coercive” or “punitive” is
important for measuring the appropriate amount of sanctions.
Addressing violations of the discharge injunction with a contempt analysis
has some drawbacks. One drawback is that possible damages might be too low
to pursue, or a pro se debtor may not be aware that something like an improper
fee attached to a proof of claim is invalid. The debtor’s attorney might not

132 See 3 NORTON JR. & NORTON III, supra note 28, § 58:2 (“A majority of courts also allow punitive
damages in appropriate cases for a violation of the discharge injunction.”).
133 Placid Ref. Co. v. Terrebone Fuel & Lube, Inc. (In re Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc.), 108 F.3d 609,
612 (5th Cir. 1997).
134 1 NORTON JR. & NORTON III, supra note 28, § 13:5 (citing In re Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, 108 F.3d at
612). The Fifth Circuit, expressing concern about finding the Article III power of criminal contempt in a nonArticle III bankruptcy court, held that “bankruptcy courts do not have inherent criminal contempt powers, at
least with respect to the criminal contempts not committed in (or near) their presence.” In re Hipp, Inc., 895
F.2d 1503, 1511 (5th Cir. 1990). The Eighth Circuit has ruled that finding the authority to grant criminal
contempt “attributes to bankruptcy judges no more of ‘the judicial power of the United States,’ than does
giving them jurisdiction over core proceedings in the first place.” Brown v. Ramsay (In re Ragar), 3 F.3d
1174, 1180 (8th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
135 Wasson, Jr., supra note 111, at 133.
136 In re Hardy, 97 F.3d 1384, 1389 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Jove Eng’g, Inc. v. IRS, 92 F.3d 1539, 1554
(11th Cir. 1996)) (“The language of § 105 encompasses ‘any type of order, whether injunctive, compensative
or punitive, as long as it is ‘necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of’ the Bankruptcy Code.’”).
An example of the importance of context is noted by the Eleventh Circuit, where the court stated that in
contrast to § 105, the language of § 106 “unequivocally waives sovereign immunity for court-ordered
monetary damages under § 105, although such damages may not be punitive.” Id. at 1390 (quoting Jove Eng’g,
92 F.3d at 1554).
137 See In re Sielaff, 164 B.R. 560, 573 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994).
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contest an improper fee if the costs of objecting to the fee are greater than “the
distribution the claim will receive under the plan.”138 Similarly, even though a
technical violation of the discharge may have occurred, a debtor or the debtor’s
attorney will not achieve any practical benefit to pursuing relief under the
contempt analysis. One of the ways that debtors have learned to deal with this
scenario is advancing different legal arguments to broaden the scope of the
injury. Specifically, debtors have argued for class certification in cases of
widespread creditor abuses, which could allow a class of debtors to bring an
action that might be too difficult to bring individually, which is discussed
below.
B. Contempt in a Class Action
A class action can provide a useful tool for debtors to push back against the
better organized, better positioned creditors. With unsecured debt, there are
likely many debtors affected by the practices of a single creditor. If those
practices are violating the discharge injunction on a widespread basis, the
impact on the debtor’s fresh start will also be widespread. One way to remedy
this would be through a class action, but litigants seeking class action
certification encounter difficulties with the Code.
These difficulties stem from the Code’s silence on the topic of class
actions, as well as from the jurisdictional limits that accompany a contempt
analysis. The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure permit class actions in
adversary bankruptcy proceedings through incorporation of Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.139 Even among courts that have found
statutory support for the class action, however, the class action remedy has
been curtailed by jurisdictional restraints.
The two-part argument against allowing a class action is straightforward,
focusing on (1) the limits of a court’s jurisdiction to hear class actions; and (2)
the lack of statutory support in the Code. While courts generally agree on the
first part, that only the court that issued the injunction has the jurisdictional
power to enforce it,140 they are split on whether the Code permits a class
action. The source of the circuit division is whether a class action is
138

Kara Bruce, The Debtor Class, 88 TUL. L. REV. 21, 37 (2013).
Id. at 42.
140 Alderwoods Grp., Inc. v. Garcia, 682 F.3d 958, 970 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he court that enters an
injunctive order retains jurisdiction to enforce its order. In this respect, a bankruptcy court is no different than
any other federal court, which possesses the inherent power to sanction contempt of its orders.”).
139
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“demonstrably necessary” and “consistent with the Code.”141 Courts holding
that the Code does not permit the class action turn to § 524, finding that the
statute neither expresses nor implies a private right of action.142 For example,
the Ninth Circuit in Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank concluded that § 524 did not
create a right for a private right for a class action.143 The analysis in Walls is
instructive when considering how other courts have found a legal theory in
support of a class action for discharge injunction violations.
In Walls, the debtor attempted to bring a class action lawsuit against Wells
Fargo pursuant to § 524, arguing the statute created “substantive rights in favor
of the debtor,” and that the bankruptcy court could enforce these rights through
its statutory contempt powers (i.e., § 105).144 If the court had accepted this
argument, it would have potentially empowered debtors to bring class actions
to remedy widespread discharge injunction violations. The court, however,
determined that neither the plain language of the statute nor the legislative
history of the Code provided the relief the debtor sought.145 The Ninth Circuit
held that there was no indication “that Congress intended to create a private
right of action under § 524, and we shall not imply one.”146
In contrast, courts that have found statutory support for a class action
lawsuit rely on § 105. In Bessette v. Avco Financial Services, the First Circuit
held that the bankruptcy court’s § 105 power could properly be invoked to
support a class action suit “if the equitable remedy utilized is demonstrably
necessary to preserve a right elsewhere provided in the Code.”147 The court
cautioned, however, that a bankruptcy court should permit this remedy “so
long as the court acts consistent with the Code and does not alter the Code’s
distribution of other substantive rights.”148
Bessette’s reach is limited, however. The First Circuit expressly declined to
rule on the “suitability of class certification in these circumstances.”149 With
the First Circuit’s identification of a legal argument in support of a class action
141

Id.
Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 510 (9th Cir. 2002).
143 Id. at 511.
144 Id. at 506.
145 Id. at 508–10.
146 Id. at 510 (“Congress evidently saw no reason to change things as they were (and are): there is no
private right of action under § 524.”).
147 Bessette v. Avco Fin. Servs., 230 F.3d 439, 445 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Noonan v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs. (In re Ludlow Hosp. Soc’y, Inc.), 124 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1997)).
148 Id. (citing In re Ludlow Hosp. Soc’y, 124 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1997)).
149 Id. at 446.
142

SHERMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

12/15/2016 3:14 PM

ANOTHER ARROW IN THE QUIVER

289

to remedy violations of the discharge injunction, the Rhode Island District
Court certified a class on remand, but limited the class to debtors within the
court’s jurisdiction.150 The bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction is limited to estates
located within the physical jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.151 Thus, the
district court held that “[i]f the petition for bankruptcy is not filed in Rhode
Island, the estate is not located here, and the Court has no jurisdiction.”152 The
district court concluded its opinion with precise and careful language. “What
remains of this lawsuit is very basic: It is an action for contempt on behalf of
plaintiff and, potentially, a class of similarly situated debtors whose
bankruptcy was filed or discharged in Rhode Island.”153
The debtor in Bessette could not overcome the jurisdictional component for
an appropriate class action. Although a class action seems like “the perfect
procedural device to remedy systematic, widespread violations of law by a
single defendant,”154 the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction must be established
over all members of the putative class.155
The bankruptcy court in Bessette adopted the approach of the so-called
“home court cases.” The home court cases permit classes but restrict those
classes “to debtors within the district in which the class action is
commenced.”156 The district where the class action originates holds exclusive
jurisdiction of “all of the property of the debtor’s estate” pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(e).157 Exclusive jurisdiction, however, is geographically limited and,
therefore, home court cases refuse to expand a class beyond the geographic
limits of its own jurisdiction.158 According to these cases, causes of action are
treated as property of the debtor’s estate.159 Thus, the class action as a remedy
for widespread violations of the discharge injunction may be “demonstrably

150 Bessette v. Avco Fin. Servs., 279 B.R. 442, 449 (D.R.I. 2002) (finding “the Court only has jurisdiction
over claims that are related to bankruptcy estates in the District of Rhode Island”).
151 Id. at 447 (finding its subject matter jurisdiction limited because “[i]f one has not been subject to an
order, one cannot violate an order, and cannot be sanctioned or punished for contempt.”).
152 Id. at 449.
153 Id. at 454–55 (emphasis added).
154 Williams v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (In re Williams), 244 B.R. 858, 862 (S.D. Ga. 2000).
155 See Bessette v. Avco Fin. Servs., 230 F.3d 439, 448 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding the location of the estate is
the key factor in determining bankruptcy jurisdiction).
156 Bruce, supra note 138, at 56.
157 Id. at 57.
158 Id. at 56.
159 Id. at 58.
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necessary” to afford relief, but it has not been found to be “consistent with the
Code.”160
Even in Conley v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., which sprang from Sears’s
widespread and systematic practice of entering into reaffirmation agreements
without court approval,161 the debtors’ claims were settled without resolving
the jurisdictional question.162 The Conley court conditionally certified a
nationwide class of debtors, with Sears’s consent, for settlement purposes.163
Shortly after the conditional certification of a nationwide class, Sears settled.164
The settlement was made under an agreement between Sears and the FTC,
which had threatened “an enforcement action against Sears pursuant to Section
19 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.”165 The court in Conley did uphold
an “award of attorneys’ fees as a settlement of the class action,”166 but this, too,
arguably failed to establish jurisdiction because the settlement was “entered
into pursuant to a consent order between the FTC and Sears.”167
While the circuit courts in both Walls and Bessette diverged on the
existence of a legal theory supporting a class action to remedy widespread
violations of the discharge injunction, the availability of a class action has, in
practice, been greatly limited because of jurisdiction.
C. Can the Sale of Discharged Debt Violate the Injunction?
The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio in In re Lafferty
consolidated two injunction violation cases involving a bank as the original
creditor and a debt collection agency, which purchased the debts after they had

160

Bessette, 230 F.3d at 445.
222 B.R. 181, 182 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998); see also In re Latanowich, 207 B.R. 326, 337 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1997) (concluding that “Sears’s disregard for the law and for the rights of the Debtor in this case was
also systematic, a matter of company policy”). For background information on the Sears reaffirmation
agreement scandal, see generally Mark J. Balthazard, The Criminal Side of Sears, U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL. (Exec.
Office for U.S. Att’ys, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 1999, at 71. This discussion cites to different opinions
because the scandal spanned several states and involved various plaintiffs suing Sears on nearly identical facts.
162 Conley, 222 B.R. 181. In discussing the jurisdictional question, the In re Williams court noted that,
although the defendant consented, jurisdiction was never conclusively established because “parties cannot
confer subject matter jurisdiction on a federal court by virtue of their consent.” 244 B.R. 858, 863 (S.D. Ga.
2000).
163 Id. at 184.
164 Id. at 185.
165 In re Williams, 244 B.R. at 864.
166 Id. at 863.
167 Id. at 863–64.
161
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been discharged.168 Both debtors carried unsecured debts in favor of Ohio
Savings Bank when they filed for bankruptcy in the late 1980s.169 Both debtors
listed the Ohio Savings debts in their schedules, and Ohio Savings filed proofs
of claim in both cases.170 Both debts were discharged in the bankruptcies.171
More than eight years after the discharges, National Check Bureau
(“National”) brought state court actions to collect the discharged debts.172 In
response to the state court actions, both debtors successfully reopened their
bankruptcy cases, and the court found Ohio Savings to be guilty of violating
the injunction and jointly and severally liable for actual damages caused to the
debtors.173
The bankruptcy court found that both Ohio Savings and National had
violated the discharge injunction. Ohio Savings violated the injunction when it
sold the discharged debts to National because it knew that National would try
to collect those debts.174 Although National was the entity that actually
attempted to collect, Ohio Savings could have prevented those collection
attempts by properly identifying “those accounts that had been discharged in
bankruptcy.”175 Ohio Savings could not easily identify the accounts that were
uncollectable because of bankruptcy discharges, however, because its coding
system coded all uncollectable accounts the same way “and did not delineate
the reason the account was uncollectible.”176 Although Ohio Savings had since
upgraded its coding system to one which coded bankruptcy separately, those
upgrades failed to “insulate it from liability for damage caused by its
historically inadequate memorialization of notices received from bankruptcy
courts.”177
Even though National abandoned the suits, the court still found that
National violated the injunction when it filed suit to collect on the debts in
state court.178 National argued it did not know the debts were discharged
168

229 B.R. 707 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1998).
Id. at 709.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 In the first case, the debt was discharged in October 1988; in the second case, the debt was discharged
in June 1989. Id. National brought suit on both discharged debts in August 1997. Id. at 710.
173 Id. at 715.
174 “The selling of accounts is a deliberate act to collect on a discharged debt . . . [because] Ohio Savings
knew that National would take action to collect against the debtors on those accounts.” Id. at 714.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 711.
177 Id. at 714.
178 Id. at 715.
169
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because it had relied upon Ohio Savings’ representations in the sale agreement.
The court, however, found multiple instances that put National on notice that
debts it bought from Ohio Savings were not legally collectible.179 In one of
those instances, National admitted to receiving “an ‘alarming’ response to its
30-day demand letters claiming that the debts had been discharged in
bankruptcy.180
Not every bankruptcy court would reach the result of In re Lafferty. In
Finnie v. First Union Bank, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia found that the language of § 524(a)(2) did not extend to prevent the
sale of discharged debt when the seller does not retain any control over any
postsale collection efforts.181 Only the purchaser of the debt who attempts to
collect the discharged debt may be found to violate the injunction.182
Collection by proxy is also impermissible; a creditor may not simply employ
“a collection agency to recover a discharged debt on its behalf.”183 But an
outright sale of debt to a third party is not a violation of the injunction.
The opposite results from the courts in Ohio and Virginia are
anomalous from a statutory construction point of view. Section 524 does
expressly classify the sale of discharged debts as a violation of
injunction.184 Reasonable judges can and do disagree over the extent of
injunction’s reach in these cases.

not
not
the
the

D. Failure to Report the Discharge of a Debt to a Credit Reporting Agency
The failure of a creditor to update a debtor’s credit report information
following a discharge is another contested area relating to the discharge
injunction. A failure to update a prepetition credit report following the
discharge is not usually a violation of the injunction for two reasons. First, a
discharge order does not technically wipe out the debt—it only eliminates the

179
180
181
182
183
184

Id.
Id.
275 B.R. 743, 746 (E.D. Va. 2002).
Id. at 745.
Id. at 746.
Id.
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debtor’s “personal obligation to pay the debt.”185 Second, under the Code,
creditors are not required to update credit information following a discharge.186
Notwithstanding the usual rule, one court found a report to a credit
reporting agency to violate the injunction. In In re Sommersdorf, the
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio found that a creditor had
violated the automatic stay by reporting to a credit reporting agency that a debt
was charged off, even though the debtor’s chapter 13 plan provided for full
payment of the debt.187 Generally, courts have held that the “failure to update
pre-petition credit information” following the discharge does not, by itself,
violate the discharge injunction.188 The facts of In re Sommersdorf were,
however, particularly egregious.189 There, the debtor notified the creditor of the
full payment in the chapter 13 plan, and “requested the creditor to remove the
charge-off notation” prior to bringing an action for violation of the automatic
stay.190
Additionally, a court may find that a false report is an attempt to coerce
payment from the debtor if combined with other acts “such as substantial
contacts by telephone or mail.”191 In the absence of more egregious acts or
circumstances like in In re Sommersdorf, though, reporting the debt as charged
off is accurate, and courts will not punish creditors for reporting the truth.192
The Code does not provide a specific remedy, either.193 Attempts to
compare the Code and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), similar to the
comparison of the Code and the FDCPA, have been frustrated because of the

185 E.g., Debra Lee Hovatter, Sommersdorf’s Progeny: Can Wrong Credit Report Trigger A Debtor Claim
Under the Code?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2007, at 14 (quoting Vogt v. Dynamic Recovery Servs. (In re
Vogt), 257 B.R. 65, 70 (D. Col. 2000)).
186 In re Zine, 521 B.R. 31, 40 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2014) (quoting In re Vogt, 257 B.R. at 71) (“Admittedly,
‘[f]alse reporting, if not done to extract payment of the debt, is simply not an act proscribed by the Code.’”).
187 139 B.R. 700, 701–02 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992).
188 See Hovatter, supra note 185, at 14 n.4 (collecting cases).
189 In re Sommersdorf, 139 B.R. at 701–02 (concluding that the report was a “flagrant” violation of the
stay and “just the type of creditor shenanigans intended to be prohibited by the automatic stay”).
190 Hovatter, supra note 185, at 14; see In re Sommersdorf, 139 B.R. at 701.
191 In re Zine, 521 B.R. at 40.
192 See Hovatter, supra note 185, at 14, 74 (quoting Irby v. Fashion Bug (In re Irby), 337 B.R. 293, 296
(N.D. Ohio 2005)) (“As the Irby court pointed out, if ‘all that is being reported is the truth,’ it cannot be the
basis for violating the discharge injunction.”).
193 Id. at 14, 75 (noting the Code does not contain a “rights or remedies” provision governing credit
reporting).
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lack of significant overlap between the Code and the FCRA.194 The
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New York has held that a
debtor’s remedy for a credit report that has not been updated postdischarge is
“to obtain a copy of their credit report or reports and follow the established
process under those other Acts for updating the record, if they wish to do
so.”195 The court reached its conclusion even though the debtor offered to
prove that the inaccurate credit report hampered his fresh start.196
E. The FDCPA vs. The Code
A bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction has also been questioned with regard to
other statutes that overlap with the Code. Specifically, portions of the FDCPA
and the FCRA have been challenged because of a perceived conflict with the
Code.197 A circuit split exists over whether the FDCPA may be utilized to
punish violations of the injunction as unfair debt collection practices. While
the Ninth Circuit has held that the Code precludes use of the FDCPA to
remedy a violation of the discharge injunction, some circuits, like the Seventh
Circuit, have held that “as long as people can comply with both, then courts
can enforce both,” and the statutes do not implicitly repeal one another.198
Accordingly, courts that follow the Seventh Circuit’s approach hold that the
two statutes may coexist peacefully and a debtor may seek relief under both.199
In Randolph v. IMBS, for example, the Seventh Circuit held that the Code’s
protections from certain debt-collecting activities, both during the life of the
bankruptcy and after, could coexist with provisions of the FDCPA that dealt
with those same activities.200
194 Id. at 14, 76 (“This is not a case of reconciling two related federal statutes, for example, where courts
have tried to reconcile the Code and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act . . . . Rather, credit reporting
disputes have no place in the Code; the Code simply does not address them.”).
195 Bruno v. First USA Bank, N.A. (In re Bruno), 356 B.R. 89, 92 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2006) (emphasis
added).
196 Id. at 90–91.
197 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 524.02[c][ii] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
198 Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 2004). The court in Randolph also found that the
conflict between federal statutes is not a question of preemption. Instead, “the right question is whether one
implicitly repeals the other—and repeal by implication is a rare bird indeed.” Id. at 730.
199 Michael D. Sousa, Circuits Split: Does the Bankruptcy Code Implicitly Repeal the FDCPA?, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2006, at 20, 20; see, e.g., Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 823 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir.
2016), appeal docketed, No. 16-348 (Sept. 16, 2016).
200 Randolph, 368 F.3d at 732. Although the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion directly involved § 362(h), the
court’s analysis grouped §§ 524(a)(2) and 362(h) together. Id. at 728 (“A demand for immediate payment
while a debtor is in bankruptcy (or after the debt’s discharge) is ‘false’ in the sense that it asserts that money is
due, although, because of the automatic stay (11 U.S.C. § 362) or the discharge injunction (11 U.S.C. § 524), it
is not.”). Note also that the Randolph court cites a previous version of the Code that codified the relevant
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The FDCPA provision at issue was § 1692e(2)(A), a strict liability statute
that flatly prohibits the “false representation of the character, amount, or legal
status of any debt.”201 Under this section, however, a debt collector may escape
liability by availing itself of the bona fide error defense.202
The bona fide error, or due care, defense of § 1692k(c),203 shields from
liability a debt collector who “exercises care to avoid making false
statements.”204 For this defense to apply, the debt collector must show that the
violation “was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error
notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid
any such error.”205 This important limitation to liability flows from a critical
component of the statutory scheme: the FDCPA only regulates debt collectors,
not creditors.206 A major reason for this distinction between debt collectors and
creditors is that a debt collector’s knowledge of the debt is not necessarily the
same as the creditor’s.207 As the court stated: “The due-care defense of
§ 1692k(c) also would be pointless if creditors’ knowledge were imputed to
debt collectors.”208
In contrast to the strict liability approach of § 1692e(2)(A), the Code
sanctions willful violations of the automatic stay or the discharge injunction.209
The different standards for liability prompted the lower court to conclude that
§ 1692e(2)(A) would “interfere with the administration of bankruptcy law.”210
The possibility of violating both created an apparent conflict between the
statutes that the lower court resolved in favor of the Code.211 On appeal,
automatic stay provision at § 362(h). 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (2000) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-112 (excluding Pub. L. No. 114-92, 114-94, and 114-95))). The provision
at issue is currently located at 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (2012).
201 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) (2012); see Randolph, 368 F.3d at 730 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A)) (“A
debt collector’s false statement is presumptively wrongful under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.”).
202 Randolph, 368 F.3d at 728.
203 The Seventh Circuit’s opinion used the phrase, “due care defense,” although the statute refers to a
“bona fide error” defense. Compare id. at 729, with 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c).
204 Randolph, 368 F.3d at 728.
205 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c).
206 Randolph, 368 F.3d at 729 (“A distinction between creditors and debt collectors is fundamental to the
FDCPA, which does not regulate creditors’ activities at all.”).
207 Id. (“Courts do not impute to debt collectors other information that may be in creditors’ files—for
example, that debt had been paid or was bogus to start with.”).
208 Id.
209 Id. at 730.
210 Id. at 729.
211 Id. (citation omitted) (“The parties consented to decision by a magistrate judge . . . who concluded that
the Bankruptcy Code ‘preempts’ the FDCPA when the act alleged to transgress the FDCPA also violates the
Code.”).
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however, the Seventh Circuit ruled that it was possible to address these
provisions independently.212
Randolph presented a consolidation of three similar cases,213 in each of
which the debt collector directly contacted the debtors after they filed their
chapter 13 petitions, and even though they were represented by counsel.214 The
act of communicating with the debtor could violate both § 1692c(a) and the
automatic stay, depending on the debt collector’s knowledge.215
While acknowledging the close overlap of the statutory provisions at
issue,216 the Seventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s caution against
finding repeal by implication in the absence of “either irreconcilable conflict
between the statutes or a clearly expressed legislative decision that one replace
the other.”217 The court noted how the relevant provisions of the Code and the
FDCPA did not overlap enough to justify finding an implicit repeal.218 The
court enumerated some of the differences219 and pointed out how the FDCPA
is much more comprehensive than the Code.220 The differences between the
statutes were important to the Randolph court’s analysis because “overlapping
and not entirely congruent remedial systems can coexist.”221
The court applied its implicit repeal analysis first between different
provisions of the FDCPA and then between provisions of the FDCPA and the
Code. The court held that §§ 1692c(a) and 1692e could be addressed
independently, without undercutting “the scienter requirement [of] § 1692c(a)
to permit no-fault liability under § 1692e(2)(A).”222 In the same way,
prohibition on false statements in § 1692e(2)(A) was not in conflict with the
automatic stay because those provisions are not similar enough to find an

212

Id. at 732.
Id. at 728 (“These suits are similar in material respects, so we use one as an illustration.”).
214 Id. at 728–729.
215 Id. at 729 (noting how “[i]n the other two suits the district judge held that the Code supplies the
exclusive remedy for any debtor in bankruptcy and applied this understanding to knock out claims under
§ 1692c(a)(2) . . . [and] § 1692e(2)(A)”).
216 Id. at 731 (“Whether overlapping and not entirely congruent remedial systems can coexist is a question
with a long history at the Supreme Court, and an established answer: yes. . . . This is so even if the application
of one system is jarring against the background of another.”).
217 Id. at 730.
218 Id. at 731 (“Overlapping statutes do not repeal one another by implication.”).
219 The court created a table that delineated the differences. See id. at 730.
220 Id. at 731.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 732.
213
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implicit repeal.223 Applying the Code to the exclusion of § 1692e(2)(A) would
“eliminate all control of negligent falsehoods.”224 Likewise, the § 1692c(a) rule
on communicating about a debt with a debtor’s attorney is independent of the
automatic stay’s prohibition on acts to collect on a debt.225 The FDCPA’s
separate remedial scheme, which distinguishes between debt collectors and
creditors, required an evaluation separate from any inquiry of a violation of an
automatic stay.226
The Ninth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Walls.227 There,
§ 1692f was at issue,228 which prohibits any “unfair or unconscionable means
to collect or attempt to collect any debt.”229 The debtor argued that Wells
Fargo had violated the FDCPA because it “engaged in unfair and
unconscionable collection practices” when it collected mortgage payments
from her after the discharge was granted and without a valid reaffirmation
agreement.230 The facts of the case, however, indicated that the debtor was
actually trying to remedy a violation of the discharge injunction.231
Throughout her chapter 7 bankruptcy, Walls kept her house pursuant to a
“ride-through” option.232 The question, according to the Ninth Circuit, was not
whether the bank had violated the discharge injunction but whether the
mortgage was subject to the ride through.233 The appropriate analysis,
therefore, would involve only the relevant provisions of § 524: whether Walls
made voluntary payments under § 524(f); and whether a § 524(c) reaffirmation
223

Id. (“They are simply different rules, with different requirements of proof and different remedies.”).
Id.
225 See id. at 732–33.
226 Id. at 733 (“To the extent that plaintiffs Cross and Randolph seek relief under § 1692c(a)(2) on the
theory that the debt collectors (and not just the creditors) knew that they had counsel, again the FDCPA may
be enforced, and further proceedings are required to explore the question whether the debt collectors
themselves (as opposed to the creditors) knew that the debtors were represented by attorneys.”).
227 Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 504 (9th Cir. 2002).
228 Id. (“This appeal also raises the issue whether a discharged debtor may pursue a simultaneous claim
under . . . 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. We think not, as to do so would circumvent the Bankruptcy Code’s remedial
scheme.”). See generally Sousa, supra note 199, at 61–63 (comparing the outcomes in Randolph and Walls).
229 15 U.S.C. § 1692f (2012), recognized as repealed by implication by Townsend v. Quantum3 Grp.,
LLC, 535 B.R. 415 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2015).
230 Walls, 276 F.3d at 505, 510 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692f).
231 Id. at 510 (“There is no escaping that Walls’s FDCPA claim is based on an alleged violation of
§ 524.”).
232 Id. at 505. Ninth Circuit precedent permits “debtors who are current on their loan payments on secured
property and who continue to make payments” to “avoid making a statutory election whether to redeem the
property or reaffirm the debt pursuant to § 524(c).” Id. (citing McClellan Fed. Credit Union v. Parker (In re
Parker), 139 F.3d 668, 672–73 (9th Cir. 1998)).
233 Id. at 510.
224
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agreement was required.234 Permitting a simultaneous FDCPA claim would
therefore “circumvent the remedial scheme of the Code.”235
The split between the Randolph and Walls decisions has grown,236 and the
overlap between the FDCPA and the Code remains a source of litigation.237 In
fact, the Seventh Circuit recently declined to extend its rationale in Randolph
to another area where courts are split: time-barred proofs of claim.238 In that
case, Owens v. LVNV Funding, the court found that the bankruptcy process
provides sufficient protections against time-barred claims, with no need to
invoke the FDCPA.239 Now, the Eleventh Circuit leads the side arguing for
statutory coexistence. In two cases the Eleventh Circuit examined how the
Code and the FDCPA coexist with regard to time-barred, or stale, proofs of
claim: Crawford v. LVNV Funding,240 and Johnson v. Midland Funding,
LLC.241
In Crawford, a debt-collection agency filed a proof of claim on a stale
debt.242 The debtor filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in 2008, and, under
applicable state and federal law, the debt had been unenforceable for nearly
four years prior to the filing of the petition.243 Although the debt was
unenforceable, “neither the bankruptcy trustee nor Crawford objected to the
claim during the bankruptcy proceeding.”244 As a result, the proof of claim was
deemed allowed under § 502(a) and (b) for the amount included in the proof of
claim.245 Having failed to timely object to the stale debt, Crawford’s only
234

Id.
Id.
236 See Donald S. Maurice & Alan D. Leeth, Continued Circuit Conflicts Create Uncertainty Under the
FDCPA, 70 BUS. LAW. 637, 643–644 (2015) (listing the different approaches taken by the Third, Seventh,
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits).
237 See, e.g., Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 823 F.3d 1334, 1338 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[The] Code does
not preclude an FDCPA claim in the context of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy when a debt collector files a proof of
claim it knows to be time-barred.”); see also Maurice & Leeth, supra note 236, at 643–644 (listing the
different approaches taken by the Third, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits).
238 Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2016), aff’g No. 1:14-CV-02083-JMS, 2015
WL 1826005 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 21, 2015), appeal docketed, No. 16-315 (Sept. 12, 2016).
239 Id. at 735–36; see Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 2015 WL 1826005, at *7 n.4, aff’d, 832 F.3d 726
(quoting B–Real, LLC v. Rogers, 405 B.R. 428, 431–32 (M.D. La. 2009)) (limiting Randolph to a question of
“whether the FDCPA and the Bankruptcy Code can co-exist in a vacuum”), aff’d, 832 F.3d 726.
240 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1844 (2015).
241 823 F.3d 1334.
242 Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1257.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 1259.
245 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001 (“A proof of claim executed and filed in accordance with these rules shall
constitute prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the claim.”).
235
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remedy was to sue the debt collector for attempting to collect a time-barred
debt in violation of §§ 1692e and 1692f of the FDCPA.246
The debt collector’s strongest defense to this suit would be that an FDCPA
suit is improper because the Code controls this scenario.247 The Eleventh
Circuit did not address the implicit repeal question, however, because the debt
collector “argue[d] only that its conduct does not fall under the FDCPA or,
alternatively, did not offend the FDCPA’s prohibitions. LVNV does not
contend that the Code displaces or ‘preempts’ §§ 1692e and 1692f of the
FDCPA.”248 This unanswered question was subsequently addressed by the
Eleventh Circuit in Johnson.249
In Johnson, the court “faced a question nearly identical to the one” in
Crawford.250 This time, however, the implicit repeal issue was raised on
appeal.251 The court held that the “Code does not preclude an FDCPA claim in
the context of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy when a debt collector files a proof of
claim it knows to be time-barred.”252 Although the Code permits creditors to
file stale proofs of claim,253 when one particular subset of creditors—i.e., debt
collectors—files them, the FDCPA’s prohibitions on unfair debt collection
practices still operate.254 This includes the bona fide error defense, which
protects debt collectors filing stale proofs of claim in good faith.255
Although Johnson directly addressed the implicit repeal issue, the Eleventh
Circuit’s analysis of the FDCPA in Crawford is still informative for three
reasons.

246

Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1259.
See id. at 1261. This is the argument that won out in Walls. 276 F.3d 502, 510 (9th Cir. 2002).
248 Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1262 n.7.
249 823 F.3d 1334, 1338 (11th Cir. 2016) (“We now answer the question left open in Crawford.”), appeal
docketed, No. 16-348 (Sept. 16, 2016). This issue has been appealed to the Supreme Court and the Court is
expected to hear arguments and rule on the case by the end of June. Lawrence Hurley, Supreme Court Agrees
to Hear Debt Collection Dispute, REUTERS, Oct. 11, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-courtdebtcollection-idUSKCN12B2EQ.
250 Johnson, 823 F.3d at 1337.
251 Id.
252 Id. (emphasis added).
253 Id. at 1339 (“[W]e recognize that creditors can file proofs of claim they know to be barred by the
relevant statute of limitations . . . .”).
254 Id. (noting that debt collectors “are not free from all consequences of filing these [stale] claims”).
255 Id. The bona fide error defense appears at 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2012) (“A debt collector may not be
held liable in any action brought under this subchapter if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of
evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the
maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.”).
247
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First, the court explained the framework for addressing an FDCPA claim.
This framework has two parts. The first part is that the FDCPA gives debtors
“a private right of action” to remedy violations of its provisions.256 The second
part is identifying what types of behavior are banned by §§ 1692e and 1692f.
Section 1692e bans the use of “any false, deceptive, or misleading
representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.”257 The
related § 1692f prohibits any “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or
attempt to collect any debt.”258 Given the ambiguity in defining what is
included in “unfair or unconscionable,”259 the Eleventh Circuit has “adopted a
‘least-sophisticated consumer’ standard to evaluate whether a debt collector’s
conduct is ‘deceptive,’ ‘misleading,’ ‘unconscionable,’ or ‘unfair’ under the
statute.”260 This standard focuses the inquiry on whether the debt collector’s
actions would have deceived the “least-sophisticated consumer,” instead of
whether a particular consumer was deceived.261
Second, the court compared the filing of a stale proof of claim to the filing
of a stale lawsuit.262 The court found that LVNV’s actions “would likely
subject it to FDCPA liability had it filed a lawsuit to collect this time-barred
debt in state court.”263 Similarly, the court noted how other courts, utilizing the
“least sophisticated consumer” standard, have “reasoned that the FDCPA
outlaws ‘stale suits to collect consumer debts’ as unfair.”264 Much of what
makes a stale suit unfair is underscored by the purpose of statutes of
limitations.

256

(2015).

Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1844

257 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2012), recognized as repealed by implication by Townsend v. Quantum3 Group,
LLC, 535 B.R. 415 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2015).
258 Id. § 1692f, recognized as repealed by implication by Townsend, 535 B.R. 415.
259 Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1258 (noting that “Congress did not provide a definition for the terms ‘unfair’
or ‘unconscionable’” and then recounting the Eleventh Circuit’s previous attempt to come up with a
definition).
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id. at 1260.
263 Id. at 1259.
264 Id. at 1260. The Seventh Circuit declined to follow Crawford, suggesting that the bankruptcy process
affords sufficient protection. Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726, 735–36 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting,
inter alia, that “the concerns . . . regarding the misleading or deceptive nature of the conduct are less acute
when a proof of claim is filed in bankruptcy, especially in a counseled case, as opposed to when a lawsuit is
filed in state or federal court”).
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Statutes of limitations recognize that “the right to be free of stale claims in
time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.”265 In the bankruptcy
context, statutes of limitations provide a “bright line for debt collectors and
consumer debtors.”266 Faded memories and vanishing documents accompany
the passage of time.267 Just as filing a time-barred lawsuit in state court would
be an unfair and deceptive means of collecting a stale debt, so, too, filing a
proof of claim in bankruptcy would be “‘unfair,’ ‘unconscionable,’
‘deceptive,’ and ‘misleading’ within the broad scope of § 1692e and
§ 1692f.”268
Third, the conclusion that filing a time-barred proof of claim is a type of
activity the FDCPA bars is not inconsistent with the automatic stay because the
automatic stay does not cover this type of activity.269 The Eleventh Circuit’s
approach to this third point is reminiscent of the Randolph court’s
“overlapping but not entirely congruent” approach.270 The automatic stay
provision suspends actions to collect a debt “outside the procedural
mechanisms of the Code.”271 It says nothing about filing a stale proof of claim
in a bankruptcy proceeding. Filing a stale proof of claim, though, is at least “an
‘indirect’ means of collecting a debt,” and thus subject to the FDCPA.272
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinions are at odds with the Ninth Circuit. More
recently, the Eight Circuit has disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s
approach.273 In Nelson v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., the Eighth Circuit
refused to extend the FDCPA’s protections to a time-barred proof of claim in a
chapter 13 bankruptcy case because the FDCPA’s consumer protection
concerns are adequately addressed by the bankruptcy process.274 The Eighth
Circuit’s standard for determining liability under the FDCPA “turns on
‘whether an unsophisticated consumer would be harassed, misled or deceived
by’ the debt collector’s acts.”275 The bankruptcy process satisfies the FDCPA’s

265

Id. (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979)).
Id.
267 Id. at 1261.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 2004).
271 Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1262 (quoting Campbell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 545 F.3d 348, 354
(5th Cir. 2008)).
272 Id.
273 828 F.3d 749, 751–52 (8th Cir. 2016).
274 Id. at 752.
275 Id. (citing Freyermuth v. Credit Bureau Servs., 248 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 2001)).
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concerns, however, by providing “trustees who owe fiduciary duties to all
parties and have a statutory obligation to object to unenforceable claims.”276
The circuit split is at a tipping point.277 The Johnson278 and Owens279
opinions have been appealed, and the Supreme Court is expected to “hear
arguments and rule on the [Johnson] case by the end of June.”280 The current
divide speaks volumes about the state of the law. Debtors, on the one hand, are
searching out “nuances that distinguish their situations from” previous cases, a
la Johnson.281 Debtors exploit the gaps in the overlapping but not entirely
congruent statutes because the FDCPA provides a more favorable remedy to
debtors.282 Courts, on the other hand, are resorting to their “equitable powers to
stop what they view as unfair practices.”283 The Eleventh Circuit has noted the
recent “deluge” of “[c]onsumer debt buyers—armed with hundreds of
delinquent accounts purchased from creditors . . . filing proofs of claim on
debts deemed unenforceable under state statutes of limitations.”284 As debtors
struggle to make the most of their fresh start, violations of the discharge
injunction should not burden their efforts, whether intentional or unintentional.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION—A DEBT COLLECTION REGISTRY SYSTEM
Although debtors have many tools to enforce their discharge injunction
under the Code, these tools, coupled with the FDCPA’s bona fide error
defense, leave debtors without a remedy for unintentional violations by debt
collectors. This Comment recommends a remedy for this gap—the Registry
System—a national registry to house consumer discharge orders that requires
debt collectors to search the registry prior to a first collection attempt. Based
276

Id. (quoting Gatewood v. CP Med., LLC, (In re Gatewood), 533 B.R. 905, 909 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2015)).
See generally, Adam Gilbert, Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don’t, EMORY L. SCH. SUP. CT.
ADVOC. PROGRAM: SUNDAY SPLITS (Oct. 16, 2016), http://sundaysplits.com/2016/10/16/damned-if-you-dodamned-if-you-dont/ (providing a brief overview of the circuit split).
278 Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 823 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2016), appeal docketed, No. 16-348
(Sept. 16, 2016).
279 Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2016), aff’g 2015 WL 1826005, appeal
docketed, No. 16-315 (Sept. 12, 2016).
280 Hurley, supra note 249.
281 Alane A. Becket, An Uneasy Harmony, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2002, at 10, 55.
282 Id. (“[T]he damages available pursuant to the FDCPA would appear to be more desirable than the
relief provided by the contempt powers of the courts.”).
283 Brittany M. Dant, Comment, Down the Rabbit Hole: Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC Upends the
Role of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act in Consumer Bankruptcy, 66 MERCER L. REV. 1067, 1083
(2014).
284 Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1844
(2015).
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on the prevalence of consumer debt in America and the lack of adequate
information associated with debt sales and debt collection efforts, a national
registry would provide a safeguard mechanism through which unfair,
deceptive, or abusive debt collection practices will be easier to punish and will
be more costly for the abuser. The Registry System’s requirements should, in
turn, reach upstream to reduce or stop the abuse in the first instance.
Specifically, the safeguard mechanism will function as follows. First, a
national registry should be established to house discharge orders. Debtors will
bear the burden of uploading a copy of the discharge order into the registry.
The Registry System will automatically time-stamp each uploaded discharge
order.285
Second, the debt collector will be required to search the database prior to
attempting to collect on a debt to verify that no order in the registry indicates
that the debt has been discharged. The debt collector must include a
verification statement with any initial debt collection effort. The required
verification statement must provide the date and time that the debt collector
checked the registry, and that no discharge order was found for the debtor. The
verification statement must be included as part of the required debt validation
materials of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g.
Third, penalties should be governed by the FDCPA and assessed against a
debt collector who fails to search the database or fails to either include a copy
of the verification in the initial collection letter or disclose that the registry was
searched in the initial phone call. A debtor should also be permitted to sue any
debt collector for failure to comply with the registry requirements.
A. The Registry Database
The idea of a registry is not new. In 2013, the Bureau included in its
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking a question soliciting the anticipated
costs and benefits of a repository for documents and information related to
unsecured debts.286 The benefits of such a repository are tantalizing: a way for
documentation for, and ownership of, unsecured consumer debts to be

285 The Registry System should have a log-in requirement for debt collectors and debtors. By requiring a
log-in to upload discharge orders and to search, the Registry System can record all of the searches performed
by a user.
286 Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67,848, 67,856 (proposed Nov. 12, 2013) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006).
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tracked.287 The repository would be for unsecured debts what the county
recorder’s offices throughout the country are for secured debts: a way to put
the world on notice about the chain of title.288 The Bureau may no longer be
seriously pursuing the repository idea, as judged from its most recent update on
the status of its debt collection regulation efforts, which did not mention it.289
The registry will only house discharge orders. Debtors who have received a
discharge order may choose to upload a copy of the order into the registry
database.290 To ensure that debt collectors can accurately match up the debtors
listed in their accounts with discharge orders in the database, any debtor who
uploads a discharge order must provide identifying information, including their
name, the last four digits of their social security number, the chapter of
bankruptcy, and their date of birth. With the exception of the chapter of
bankruptcy, these pieces of information are so commonly used to identify
individuals today that they will be necessary to make the database a useful
resource for debt collectors.291

287 See Jiménez, supra note 3, at 103 (“This ‘chain of title’ record-keeping and account document storage
could be the most helpful features in a repository.”).
288 Id. at 102. Professor Jiménez has noted the industry support for this idea from two companies. One of
those companies even touted the chain of title benefits of a registry in a whitepaper:

Businesses and individuals would not dream of buying real property, automobiles, or anything
else of value without first having its ownership status verified by a third party. If one would not
buy a car or house without title confirmation, why would one spend thousands or millions buying
debt without the same protection?
Id. (quoting Daniel J. Langin, Introducing Certainty to Debt Buying: Account Chain of Title Verification for
Debt, GLOBAL DEBT REGISTRY (Jan. 5, 2011), https://perma.cc/9YPA-7J6V).
289 See Small Business Review Panel for Debt Collector and Debt Buyer Rulemaking: Outline of
Proposals Under Consideration and Alternatives Considered, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (July 28, 2016),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/20160727_cfpb_Outline_of_proposals.pdf. This may be the
product of insufficient support for the repository. For example, Professors McCoy and Jiménez expressed
concern about the potential of having a negative experience similar to what happened with the Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”). Patricia A. McCoy & Dalié Jiménez, Comment to Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Debt Collection (Regulation F), 14–17, https://perma.cc/3T7J-ZDED. In
addition, they urged that any implementation of a repository must first seriously consider how the FCRA might
be interpreted to cover the repository. Id. at 17–18. The proposed Registry System can avoid these concerns
altogether because of its limited scope. Furthermore, the Registry System may also be useful as a test-run
repository, informing future attempts to create a system of record for unsecured debt.
290 The attorney or legal representative for the debtor should also be permitted to upload the order. This
can be noted by including a check-the-box option (e.g., “□ I am the debtor’s attorney or legal representative”)
when uploading to the database. It will be easy enough for a debtor’s attorney to upload the order as part of the
package of legal services provided.
291 These pieces of information will also help to weed out false positives triggered by a similar name.
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B. Operation
Once the debtor has uploaded a copy of the discharge to the registry, all
initial debt collection actions must include a verification stating that the debt
collector has checked the registry and that the debt at issue has not been
discharged in bankruptcy; or if it has, that the discharge has been revoked. This
verification must be sent out as part of the validation-of-debts requirement of
§ 1692g.292 Although the discharge order does not list out all the discharged
debts item-by-item, or account-by-account, it does give a case number and
indicates the bankruptcy court where the case was filed. That information
provides debt collectors with sufficient notice that the debt they seek to collect
has already been discharged. Thus, debt collectors that comply with the
registry requirements will reduce the likelihood of violating the discharge
injunction.
C. Creation and Implementation of the Registry System
The first, and best, way to create the Registry System is by Congressional
amendment for two reasons. From the perspective of establishing an
overarching policy, Congress can emphasize the FDCPA’s continued relevance
and the importance of treating the fresh start policy seriously by lending its
imprimatur to the Registry System. From a litigation-avoiding perspective,
Congress should implement the Registry System because it can directly
address the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense for debt collectors.
The bona fide error defense is a crucial component of the debt collection
regulatory scheme, as Congress has recognized that debt collectors do not have
the same access to information as creditors. The Registry System changes the
disparity of access to information as it relates to bankruptcy discharges and, in
effect, forces debt collectors to rely on a source of information independent of
the creditor’s own knowledge. Any rules promulgated by the Bureau to
implement the Registry System would have to face the question of whether the
bona fide error defense could be legitimately obviated by an administrative
agency’s rule. Congressional amendment, which makes clear that the Registry
System functionally obviates application of the bona fide error defense in
specific circumstances, will go a long way to avoiding litigation over the issue
of whether the defense still applies to the Registry System.
292 15 U.S.C. § 1692g provides that debt collectors must provide certain validation-of-debt information
either with the initial communication or within five days of the initial communication. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g
(2012).
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The second possible way to create the Registry System is by agency rulemaking authority. The Bureau is well-suited to implement the Registry System,
given its mission “to protect consumers and level the playing field in the
financial marketplace” and its rulemaking authority.293 In fact, the Bureau is
already working to issue rules that will govern the debt collection industry. In
November 2013, the Bureau issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rule
Making for debt collection.294 As of this writing, however, the Bureau remains
in the information-gathering stage, most recently publishing an Outline of
Proposals Under Consideration and Alternatives Considered.295
When Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010,
its broad purpose was a response to the nation’s financial crisis: “To promote
the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and
transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the
American taxpayer by ending bailouts, [and] to protect consumers from
abusive financial services practices.”296 With Dodd–Frank, Congress amended
the FDCPA by authorizing the Bureau to “prescribe rules with respect to the
collection of debts by debt collectors.”297
As the “first federal agency solely focused on consumer financial
protection,”298 the Bureau is better positioned than the bankruptcy courts to
administer the Registry System, and the creation of such a registry falls within
293

Richard Cordray, Foreword: Consumer Protection in the Financial Marketplace, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 307, 307 (2015).
294 Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67,848 (proposed Nov. 12, 2013) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 1006).
295 Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Small Business Review Panel for Debt Collector and Debt Buyer
Rulemaking (2016), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/20160727_cfpb_Outline_of_proposals.pdf.
296 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010).
297 15 U.S.C. § 1692l(d). Prior to Dodd–Frank, the FDCPA fell primarily within the province of the
Federal Trade Commission. The FTC, however, was limited to enforcing the provisions of the FDCPA and
proposing suggested changes to Congress. It lacked the authority to promulgate rules. Id. § 1692l (“Neither the
Commission nor any other agency referred to in subsection (b) of this section may promulgate trade regulation
rules or other regulations with respect to the collection of debts by debt collectors as defined in this
subchapter.”). Instead, the FTC was required to include a summary of any “necessary or appropriate” changes
to the FDCPA in its annual report to Congress. Id. § 1692m. In fact, the FTC recommended that Congress
empower the FTC “to issue rules to implement the FDCPA.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, COLLECTING CONSUMER
DEBTS: THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE 70 (2009), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/debtcollection/dcwr.pdf.
In 2010, Congress took the FTC’s recommendation, but vested rulemaking authority in a brand new agency—
the Bureau—rather than granting that authority to the FTC. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, supra note 47,
at 3. There remains some overlap between the FTC and the CFPB, however, such that the two agencies
continue to work together to “enforce the laws applicable to debt collectors.” Id.
298 Consumer Response Annual Report (January 1–December 31, 2014), supra note 94, at 6.
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the ambit of the Bureau’s mission. Bankruptcy courts lack the legal authority
to create and implement this kind of solution. As “one of the few major federal
civil statutory regimes administered almost exclusively through adjudication in
the courts,”299 the courts lack the flexibility of rulemaking authority.300 The
Code does have two federal agencies that support it—the United States Trustee
Program (“USTP”) and the Bankruptcy Administrators Program—but they
have critical shortcomings.
The USTP is not designed to handle this type of solution. It is a part of the
Department of Justice, consisting of twenty-one regional offices, each run by
just one U.S. Trustee.301 Its mission is to serve as a bankruptcy watchdog302 “to
promote the integrity and efficiency of the bankruptcy system for the benefit of
all stakeholders – debtors, creditors, and the public.”303 The USTP polices
bankruptcy practices of creditors such as banks. They use their investigatory
powers to “protect[] the integrity of the bankruptcy system by overseeing case
administration and litigating to enforce bankruptcy laws.”304 Investigations
may end in settlements in which the offending institution agrees to pay
restitution to consumers they have harmed.
The Bankruptcy Administrators Program is the equivalent of the USTP in
Alabama and North Carolina.305 Together, the Bankruptcy Administrators and
the U.S. Trustees function as watchdogs, ensuring enforcement of bankruptcy
laws.306 The mandates of these two programs, however, are not keyed to
implementing the Registry System.307
299 Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60
UCLA L. REV. 384, 386 (2012).
300 Id. at 384 (“Unlike policy set by regulatory agencies through notice-and-comment rulemaking, courts
set policy through case-by-case adjudication and decide only the matters presented in a particular case.”).
301 Id. at 394–95.
302 U.S. Trustee Program: About the Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/ust/aboutprogram#FTI (last updated May 12, 2016).
303 U.S. Trustee Program: Strategic Plan & Mission, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/ust/
strategic-plan-mission (last updated May 8, 2015).
304 U.S. Trustee Program: About the Program, supra note 302.
305 Pardo & Watts, supra note 299, at 397 (“Despite covering different geographic territory, the duties of
the UST and BA Programs largely mirror each other.”). For an excellent description of the two systems—and
an interesting bit of political and historical trivia—see id. at 395–97.
306 Id. at 398.
307 See id. at 394 (“[The USTP and Bankruptcy Administration Program] do not possess the power to set
policy relating to the restructuring of debtor-creditor relationships under the Code.”). In Fiscal Year 2016, the
Bureau had 1,623 employees, and, for Fiscal Year 2017, it projected a total of 1,757 employees. CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU, THE CFPB STRATEGIC PLAN, BUDGET, AND PERFORMANCE PLAN AND REPORT 12 tbl.2
(2016), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201602_cfpb_report_strategic-plan-budget-and-performance-plan_
FY2016.pdf.
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D. Penalties under the Registry System
The penalty scheme for failing to comply with the Registry System can be
established in one of two ways. First, if Congress chooses to create the
Registry System by amending the FDCPA, it could also choose to change the
penalty scheme. The FDCPA currently provides that “any debt collector who
fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter with respect to any
person is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum of” actual
damages; statutory damages as the court allows up to $1000; and costs of the
action plus reasonable attorney’s fees.308 Within the context of the Registry
System, the damages most likely to be awarded will be statutory damages and
reasonable attorney’s fees.309 Congress could choose to beef up the penalty
scheme for violations of the Registry System, for example, by placing a higher
ceiling on statutory damages, or by providing a range, with a minimum
damages amount required to be awarded upon a showing of a violation, and
capped by a ceiling amount.310 The fee shifting provision should also remain,
as an incentive for lawyers to take up these claims. Amending the penalty
scheme is an additional way for Congress to affirm its commitment to
furthering the goals of the FDCPA and the Code.
Alternatively, regardless of whether Congress or the Bureau creates the
Registry System, the consequences of debt collectors failing to comply will fit
into the existing penalty scheme of the FDCPA; there is no need for a separate
penalty scheme.
These penalties should be available to debtors in actions against a debt
collector that fails to comply with the Registry System. The bona fide error
defense should not offer the offending debt collector much protection because
the debt collector is required to take affirmative steps to ensure that a debt has
not been discharged prior to attempting to collect it.

308

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (2012).
Because the Registry System targets initial collection attempts, an award of actual damages seems
unlikely.
310 A more robust discussion of possible iterations of a new statutory damages scheme is beyond the scope
of this Comment. For background material on statutory damages, see generally Emerging Issues in Statutory
Damages, JONES DAY, July 2011, http://www.jonesday.com/emerging_issues_in_statutory_damages/#_
ftnref56.
309
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E. Benefits of the Solution
The Registry System furthers policy goals, provides legal advantages in the
current Code–FDCPA dispute, and encourages positive practical results in debt
collection practices.
1. Policy Goals
The Registry System furthers two policy goals. The first goal is to provide
debt collectors with a reliable source of information. The second is to protect
the fresh start by reducing the chances of an unintentional violation.
First, the registry database will provide a reliable, easily accessible source
of information to debt collectors. The discharge order, as an official court order
signed by a bankruptcy judge, will give debt collectors a reliable piece of
information about the debtor. Although debt collectors often do not have
complete information regarding accounts, they will at least have knowledge of
the original creditor, which they can match up to the discharge order. This puts
debt collectors on notice that the debt has likely been discharged. Searching the
registry should be an easy process, because debt collectors will be able to
search with the debtor’s name, the last four numbers of the debtor’s social
security number, or date of birth, pieces of information very often provided by
the original creditor.311
Second, the Registry System will complement the Code by giving debtors a
better chance at a fresh start. The fresh start, fundamental to bankruptcy law,312
is threatened by unfair, abusive, or deceptive collection efforts. Attempting to
collect on a discharged debt is deceptive because it can lead the debtor to
believe that the debt is still owed. It is also unfair to the debtor because liability
for the debt has been discharged already. With a reliable, easily accessible
source of information, the burden on debt collectors to search the registry
should diminish collection attempts on discharged debts, thus strengthening the
debtor’s fresh start free from past debts.

311

Debtor portfolios provided to debt collectors by original creditors typically have plenty of identifying
information about debtors, including “credit applications, agreements, contracts, personal guarantees, purchase
orders and/or emails or orders for services or products.” Gerri Detweiler, Why You Can’t Hide from Debt
Collectors, ABC NEWS (Mar. 23, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/hide-debt-collectors/story?id=
23011597.
312 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).

SHERMAN GALLEYSPROOFS2

310

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

12/15/2016 3:14 PM

[Vol. 33

2. Legal Advantages
The Registry System also provides two legal advantages in resolving the
Code–FDCPA conflict. It avoids the conflict altogether, in a way that
complements the Code.
On the one hand, the Registry System avoids the Code–FDCPA conflict
discussed above.313 The Registry System does not invoke the Code, but rather
relies only on the FDCPA. It is wholly a debt collection system, designed to
prevent abuses of debt collection. Even though the Registry System is related
to the discharge injunction, failure to comply with it will not be a violation of
the discharge injunction. It will be a violation of the FDCPA.
On the other hand, a debtor can use the Registry System to help prove
allegations of a discharge injunction violation. In the case of a bad actor that
tries to collect knowingly on a discharged debt, the requirements of the
Registry System will provide prima facie evidence of the debt collector’s
actual or constructive knowledge that the debt was formally discharged.
3. Practical Results
Implementation of the Registry System should produce at least two
positive, practical results. First, the penalty scheme and the burden on debt
collectors should encourage lawyers to take on these injunction violation cases.
The cases are low risk and do not present complicated proof issues. An
attorney can determine whether a creditor received proper notice that a debt
was discharged through a simple search of the national registry. So long as the
debtor uploaded the discharge order prior to the challenged debt collection
efforts, there would be little upfront work by the attorney to verify the debtor’s
claim and to evaluate the odds of success.
Second, the search requirements on debt collectors will likely reduce the
sale of debts that have been discharged or that are currently in bankruptcy. The
costs of failing to comply with the Registry System will place debt buyers in a
better position to demand more accurate information on the debts they
purchase.

313

See discussion supra Section IV.E
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CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy should not be viewed in isolation. Many “families . . . struggle
for months before filing bankruptcy.”314 Income interruptions are a common
precursor to a bankruptcy petition.315 Bankruptcy law in America offers the
“honest but unfortunate debtor” a chance at a fresh start from many of these
past debts.316 Violations of the discharge injunction undermine that chance.
The creation and utilization of a national registry is one way to empower the
fresh start by giving debtors a tool to directly combat injunction violations.
Teddy Roosevelt famously admonished, “Speak softly and carry a big
stick.”317 Currently, debtors carry different legal weapons to preserve their
fresh start. In addition to the legal arguments available to preserve the fresh
start, the Bureau and other regulatory agencies are slowly reforming how
business is done in the debt collection industry by holding banks and debt
collectors accountable for unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices. The Registry
System will complement current efforts to curb abusive debt collection
practices by empowering consumer debtors to fight alongside the Bureau. The
Bureau, as “a 21st century agency that helps consumer finance markets work
by making rules more effective, by consistently and fairly enforcing those
rules, and by empowering consumers to take more control over their economic
lives,” is ideally situated to implement the solution.318
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